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COMPANY LAW IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND
THE UNITED STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
OF THE IMPACT OF THE EU FREEDOMS OF
ESTABLISHMENT AND CAPITAL AND THE
U.S. INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE
CHRISTOPH ALLMENDINGER
ABSTRACT
Since the decision of the European Court of Justice in the Centros
case, it has become popular in company law to draw comparisons between
the United States economic constitution and the Single European Market.
Since then, fears of a European “Delaware Effect,” which would create a
“race to the bottom,” have hounded the debate on European company
law. In this discussion, however, the unique constitutional framework of
both the EU and the U.S. is seldom regarded. This constitutional framework, nevertheless, determines the behavior of both the legislators at state
level and the market participants. This Article compares the impact of two
major principles of both constitutions on company law: the U.S. dormant
Interstate Commerce Clause and the Freedom of Establishment and the
Freedom of Capital in the EU Treaties. The Article finds that the U.S.
constitutional framework is more lenient on states and thereby grants
them broader discretion to regulate company law. Further, it will argue
that this is rooted in the specific legal set-up of the two common markets.
The European Single Market, unlike the U.S., grants explicit free movement rights to capital and direct investments, establishing a modern framework. Further, European legal doctrine is faced with the paradox that the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) equates natural
persons and companies, whereas in reality, companies differ from natural
persons in many respects. The U.S. constitutional framework instead relies
on the concept that companies are creatures of state law in order to grant
states larger powers.
Attorney-at-Law (Germany) at the Frankfurt-based law firm Hengeler Mueller,
Ruprecht-Karls-University of Heidelberg graduate 2007, LL.M. in European Law, London
School of Economics and Political Sciences 2009. The views expressed are those of the
author in his personal capacity. The author is very grateful to Edmund-Philipp Schuster
and Felipe Montejo for discussions and thoughts.
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INTRODUCTION
The Single European Market has been compared to the economic constitution of the United States of America since the early days of the European
common market project.1 The U.S. and the EU, it is said,2 share the same problem. The individual states in the U.S. and the Member States of the EU try to
secure their own advantage at the cost of one another in the superstructure.3
Comparing the U.S. economic constitution and the Single European
Market became popular in company law when the ECJ in Centros pronounced that regulatory competition was inherent in the system of the
treaty.4 Since then, fears of a European “Delaware Effect,” which would
bring about a “race to the bottom,” have hounded the debate in European
company law.5 However, both common markets have a specific constitutional framework, which determines the behavior of both the legislators at
state level and the market participants. These differences are decisive on
the extent to which the states are limited in their ability to ensure their own
policy interests at the expense of the interests of the common market. In
the Single European Market, the four market freedoms prohibit the Member
States from taking action against the free movement of production factors
(Article 26 TFEU).6 In terms of company law, the Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom of Capital are most important. The U.S. constitutional framework for companies is more multifaceted. At the very outset,
the Privileges and Immunities Clause7 is not applicable to companies, as
the U.S. Supreme Court rejects the concept of a corporate citizen.8 According to the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, corporations “are creatures
1

P. Leleux, Corporation Law in the United States and in the E.E.C., 5 COMMON MKT.
L. REV. 133 (1967).
2
Klaus Lackhoff, Restrictions on State Interference with Commerce in the U.S.A. and
the EC, 2 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 313 (1996).
3
Id.
4
Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhversus-og Selkabssyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R. I-1459, ¶ 27;
Case C-212/97, Opinion of AG La Pergola in Centros Ltd. v. Erhversus-og Selkabssyrelsen,
1999 E.C.R. I-1461, ¶ 20; see Christian Kersting, Corporate Choice of Law—A Comparison
of the United States and European Systems and a Proposal for a European Directive, 28
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2002).
5
ERIK WERLAUFF, EU-COMPANY LAW—COMMON BUSINESS LAW OF 28 STATES 100
(2d ed. 2003).
6
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 26,
Sept. 5, 2008 O.J. (C 115/59) [hereinafter TFEU].
7
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”).
8
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 175 (1869); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519,
586 (1839).
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of local law and have not even an absolute right of recognition in other
States, but depend for that and for the enforcement of their contracts upon
the assent of those States, which may be given accordingly on such terms
as they please.”9 The Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article IV, Section 1
of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given
in each state to the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every
other State.”10 Of all constitutional principles, the dormant Interstate
Commerce Clause, which restricts the states from laying burdens on interstate commerce, is most comparable to the four freedoms.11
Therefore, this Article will compare the impact the dormant Interstate
Commerce Clause has on company law in the United States with the impact the Freedom of Establishment and Freedom of Capital have on national company law in the EU.
The Interstate Commerce Clause is worth comparing with the EU
Freedoms of Establishment and Capital in respect to company law for two
reasons. Firstly, the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause is able to restrict
the states’ abilities to regulate freely companies incorporated in their territory and therefore governed by domestic law.12 In this regard, the question
arises, to what extent do the states have to respect the Interstate Commerce
Clause in company law and how much discretion remains to the states as the
company’s creator, as companies do not exist naturally but are “creatures
of national law.”13 This question, however, is not unique to the legal framework for company law in the United States but is one of the most debated
questions in European company law as well.14 Secondly, the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause in its function limits the powers of the states, not
only towards the Congress but also towards the market participants.15 In
that sense, it forms a “status negativus”—a right of every citizen against
state interference in the interstate commerce of the market subjects.16 The
dormant Interstate Commerce Clause therefore is an economic freedom.
9

Paul, 75 U.S. at 170.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
11
Erin O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, RULES AND INSTITUTIONS IN DEVELOPING A LAW
MARKET: VIEWS FROM THE U.S. AND EUROPE 20–21 (University of Illinois Law Sch. Law
& Economics Working Papers, No. 88, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1100277.
12
See Gibbons v. Odgen, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
13
Case C-81/87, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue,
ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust PLC, 1988 E.C.R. 5483 at ¶ 19.
14
Case C-210/06, Cartesio Okató és Szolgáltató Bt., 2008 E.C.R. I-9641 at ¶ 104;
Daily Mail, 1988 E.C.R. 5483 at ¶ 19.
15
See Gibbons, 22 U.S. 1.
16
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1, 2 (1910).
10
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This function brings the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause in close
agreement with the freedoms of movement of the EU Treaties.17
First, this Article will discuss the basic principles of the constitutional
set-up of the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause and the Freedom of Establishment and Freedom of Capital. The second section will address more
precise problems. It will compare the inbound situation—the approach of
both constitutional frameworks toward the regulation of foreign companies by host states. The third section will assess the so-called outbound
situation, namely, how far the two principles force the states to create their
companies in a common-market friendly way and thereby limit the discretion of the states in regulating domestic company law. In the light of the
results of the assessment, a further section will argue that the U.S. constitutional framework is more lenient on states, thereby granting them broader discretion to regulate company law. By offering an explanation for this
more lenient approach, this Article will consider the lessons that may be
drawn for European company law from U.S. American experience and
legal debate. It will present the argument that this result is rooted in the
specific legal set-up of the two common markets; unlike the U.S. constitutional framework, Europe’s different minimum capital requirements offer incentives to create pseudo-foreign companies. The Single European Market,
unlike the U.S., grants explicit free movement rights to capital and direct
investments, establishing a modern framework. Finally, European legal
doctrine is faced with the paradox that the TFEU equates natural persons
and companies, whereas companies differ from natural persons in reality
in many respects. The U.S. constitutional framework instead relies on the
thought that companies are creatures of state law in order to grant states
larger powers.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL SET-UP OF COMPANY LAW
Like every field of law, company law exists within a constitutional
framework. In the United States, company law evolved at a time when the
federal constitutional framework was already in place.18 In Europe, it was
national constitutional law and national legal tradition in opposition to European law that determined the development of company law.19 Later, the
17

See Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastigen,
1963 E.C.R. at ¶ 5 (precluding the direct application of the four freedoms).
18
See RICHARD M. BUXBAUM & K. J. HOPT, LEGAL HARMONIZATION AND THE BUSINESS
ENTERPRISE, 28–29 (Cappalletti et al. eds., 1988).
19
See Brian Cheffins, European Community Company and Securities Law: A Canadian
Perspective, 36 MCGILL L. J. 1282, 1294 (1991).
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European integration formed a new constitutional framework for company
law, first in the form of the Treaty of Rome provisions, and today in the
Treaty of the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union.20 This European constitutional framework of company
law co-exists with the constitutional frameworks at a national level.21 This
section will describe the constitutional frameworks of the U.S. and the EU
and evaluate their differences and commonalities.
A. Balance of Power
1. The Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause
The Constitution of the United States provides for a division of powers,
not only in regard to the traditional state powers but also vertically between the federation and the states.22 First of all, the residual legislative
powers are given to the states, and the powers of the federation are limited
to those delegated by the constitution.23 Article I, Sections 8 and 10 delegate these limited powers to the Congress as the federal lawmaker.24 The
Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution explicitly states: “[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”25
Additionally, the federation has to ensure that the residual power given to the
states is not used by the states to render meaningless the powers of the federal lawmakers.26 In this regard, Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution
explicitly states that the laws made in accordance with the Constitution shall
be the supreme law of the land.27 The Constitution does not explicitly prohibit the states from using their legislative power in relation to subjects
over which the Congress has not yet exercised its powers.28 However, case
law established that the competences given to the Congress entail a negative effect on the ability of states to regulate in that area.29
One of the most hard-fought,30 and at the same time most important,
powers of the Congress is laid down in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, which
20

Id. at 1286–88.
See BUXBAUM & HOPT, supra note 18, at 174–75.
22
See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 132–36 (3rd ed. 2000).
23
Leleux, supra note 1, at 134.
24
U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8, 10.
25
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
26
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803).
27
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
28
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
29
See infra note 34.
30
Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 313–14.
21
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states: “Congress shall have power ... to regulate commerce ... among the
several states ....”31 This clause is commonly called the Interstate Commerce
Clause.32 In accordance with the two principles of the vertical division of
power in a federation, the Interstate Commerce Clause prohibits the Congress legislating on commerce within the states.33 Secondly, the Interstate
Commerce Clause prohibits states from imposing regulatory burdens on
interstate commerce.34 With respect to this second function, the Commerce
Clause is called the “dormant” Interstate Commerce Clause.35 The aim of
centralizing the power over interstate commerce was twofold: the efficient
allocation of goods, labor, and investment as well as the allaying of the
fear of trade wars.36
2. The Four Freedoms in the EU
A division of power between the institutions of the European Union and
the member states exists in a strikingly similar manner. Most prominently,
the principle of conferral of powers is a basic principle of European Union
Law.37 The European Union has no section similar to Article I, Section 8 of
the U.S. Constitution, in which all the competences of the EU are framed,
but rather these are scattered throughout the TFEU. One of the central
competences can, however, be found in Article 114 TFEU, giving the legislative institutions of the EU the power to form a common market.38 As in
the U.S. Constitution, the positive power of the legislative organs and the
economic freedoms are connected like two sides of one coin. Article 114
TFEU is explicit in regard to Article 26 TFEU, which defines the internal
market as an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of
goods, persons, services, and capital is assured in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.39 The four freedoms of movement are thus directly
linked to the competences. The scope of the freedoms defines the scope of
the competences.40 More specific competences can be found right next to
31

Id. at 313.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 588 (1995).
33
Leleux, supra note 1, at 135.
34
Id.; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1852); Gibbons v. Odgen, 22
U.S. 1, 209 (1824); Freeman v. Herwitt, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946); Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982).
35
See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 579.
36
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 259, 260 (13th ed. 1997).
37
DAMIEN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW 211 (2006).
38
TFEU art. 114, at ¶ 1.
39
Id.
40
J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of the Common Market Place, in THE EVOLUTION
OF THE EU LAW 371 (Craig & Burca eds., 1999).
32
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the provisions governing the free movement right.41 Regarding the Freedom
of Establishment (Article 49 TFEU) and the Freedom of Capital (Article 63
TFEU), both limitations of member states’ powers are followed by an explicit
competence of the EU institutions to legislate in these areas in Article 50 and
Article 64 (2) TFEU. Besides these similarities in structure and function,
the aims of the rules are the same. As with the Interstate Commerce Clause,
the EU freedoms are motivated by the aim to create an internal market
(Article 26 TFEU), which provides for the optimal allocation of resources
and production factors.42
B. The Scope of the Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause and the
EU Freedoms
1. The Scope of the Dormant Interstate Commerce Clause
As there is no textual basis for the dormant Interstate Commerce
Clause, its scope remains contested.43 In sum, the dormant Interstate
Commerce Clause restricts state law in three ways.44 Firstly, state laws
discriminating “against the transactions of out-of-state actors in interstate
markets”45 are prohibited. “Out-of-state actors are non-residents of the
regulating state[s].”46 However, the scope is broadened to include discrimination against corporations incorporated under the law of another state.47
Secondly, even if there is no discrimination, state laws that are discriminatory in effect and that favor local economic interests at the expense
of out-of-state competitors have been invalidated under the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause.48 Thirdly, the dormant Interstate Commerce
Clause prohibits laws that have no discriminatory effects whatsoever, but
place an undue burden on interstate commerce.49
41

TFEU art. 2–6.
Wolfgang Schön, The Mobility of Companies in Europe and the Organizational
Freedom of Company Founders, 3 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 122, 125 (2006); GUNTHER,
supra note 36, at 260.
43
Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988) (Scalia, J.
concurring).
44
GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 270.
45
Exxon v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 136 (1978).
46
Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 320.
47
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U.S. 1 (1910); Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 320.
48
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1976); Dean
Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1950).
49
Bendix Autolite v. Midwesco Enter., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 898 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
42
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From the beginning, the U.S. Supreme Court limited the application of
these categories. Firstly, a distinction was made between direct and indirect impact on interstate commerce.50 This was soon found to be only a
label for actually balancing the local interests of the states with the national
interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce across the state.51 Today,
a balancing test is used that takes into consideration the local interests of
the state:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.... If
a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it
could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities
[(so-called Pike-Test)].52

Finally, the Interstate Commerce Clause does not apply when Congress approved the state legislation53 and where the state acts as a market
participant.54
2. The Scope of the EU Freedom of Establishment and Capital
The similarities of the scope of the EU Freedoms and the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause are demonstrative. As in the case of the Interstate
Commerce Clause, the Freedom of Establishment first evolved as an antidiscrimination rule.55 This can clearly be seen from the wording of Article 49
paragraph 2 TFEU. “Freedom of establishment shall include the right to
take up and pursue activities ... under the conditions laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment is effected ....”56
This paragraph constitutes the original Freedom of Establishment, as it
was already included in Article 52 of the Treaty of Rome (1957).57 The
ECJ then quickly broadened the scope of the Freedom of Establishment.
50

Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120–25 (1942).
Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927) (Stone, J., dissenting).
52
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citing Huron Cement Co. v.
Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960), and Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona 325 U.S. 761
(1945)); see also Edgar v. MITE Corp. 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982).
53
GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 268; Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 324.
54
GUNTHER, supra note 36, at 322; Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 324–25.
55
TFEU art. 49, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 67 [hereinafter TFEU].
56
Id.
57
Treaty of Rome, art. 52, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
51
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The member states adjusted the treaty to this case law with the result that
the current Treaty further provides that “restrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member
State shall be prohibited,” the wording now to be found in Article 49 TFEU.58
A broad understanding of the Freedom of Establishment was already
introduced by the ECJ under the Treaty of Rome, in its rulings in Klopp.59
Here, a regulation of the Paris bar association, which provided that an advocate may establish chambers in one place only, was held to violate the
Freedom of Establishment, even though this rule applied to all advocates
regardless of their nationality.60 In Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg,
the ECJ then defined the scope of the Freedom of Establishment as precluding “any national measure ... even though it is applicable without discrimination on grounds of nationality, [which] is liable to hamper or to
render less attractive the exercise by Community nationals, including
those of the Member State which enacted the measure, of fundamental
freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty.”61
This formula was consequently confirmed in the Gebhard decision.62
However, the ECJ added a balancing test.
[N]ational measures liable to hinder or make less attractive the exercise
of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty must fulfill four
conditions: they must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; they
must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest;
they must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which
they pursue; and they must not go beyond what is necessary in order to
attain it [(so-called Gebhard Test)].63

Regarding the freedom of capital, the ECJ’s judgments rely on the
same principles applied to the Freedom of Establishment and the other
freedoms. Since 1994, when it became directly applicable, the freedom of
capital, in turn, has prohibited any restriction.64 The ECJ repeatedly formulated: “Even though the rules in issue may not give rise to unequal
treatment, they are liable to impede the acquisition of shares in the undertakings concerned and to dissuade investors in other Member States from
58

TFEU art. 49, supra note 55.
Case C-107/83, Opinion of AG Slynn in Ordre des avocats au Barreau de Paris v.
Onno Klopp 1984 E.C.R. 2971.
60
Id.
61
Case C-19/92, Dieter Kraus v. Land Baden-Württemberg, 1993 E.C.R. I-1663, ¶ 32.
62
Case C-55/94, Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori
di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. I-04165, ¶ 36.
63
Id. ¶ 37.
64
STEFAN GRUNDMANN, EUROPEAN COMPANY LAW ¶ 667 (1st ed. 2007).
59
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investing in the capital of those undertakings.”65 In Commission/Belgium,
the ECJ further formulated:
The free movement of capital ... may be restricted only by national
rules which are justified ... by overriding requirements of the general
interest and which are applicable to all persons and undertakings
pursuing an activity in the territory of the host Member State. Furthermore, in order to be so justified, the national legislation must be
suitable for securing the objective which it pursues and must not go
beyond what is necessary in order to attain it, so as to accord with the
principle of proportionality.66

The justifying tests under the EU Freedoms correlate strongly to the
test applied by the U.S. Supreme Court since its judgment in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc. Firstly, both tests apply only to measures that are not discriminatory in nature.67 Secondly, the measure must aim at securing a public interest.68 Thirdly, the measure in both jurisdictions must be suitable
for achieving the public interest.69 Finally, the proportionality test under
the Freedoms of Establishment and capital provide that the measure does
not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain the general interest.70 A
similar condition exists in the Pike test.71 The extent of the burden on interstate commerce will thereafter depend on whether it could be promoted
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.72
Besides these strong similarities, the Gebhard test sets a higher standard
of control. First of all, the Gebhard test asks not only whether the state measure protects a local public interest, but also whether there is an imperative
requirement of public interest.73 This requires the ECJ to decide if the public interest pursued by the measure is compelling enough in order to justify
the hindering effects on freedom. Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court applies the necessity test in a much weaker form than the ECJ. Whereas the
ECJ controls the suitability of the measures, the Pike test requires only that
65

See Case C-483/99, Comm’n v. France, 2002 E.C.R. I-4781, ¶ 41; Case C-367/98,
Comm’n v. Portugal, 2002 ECR I-4731, ¶ 45.
66
Case C-503/99, Comm’n v. Belgium, 2002 E.C.R. I-4809, ¶ 45; see also Comm’n v.
France, 2002 E.C.R. I-4781 at ¶ 45; Comm’n v. Portugal, 2002 E.C.R. I-4731 at ¶ 49.
67
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970); Case C-55/94, Reinhard
Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano, 1995 E.C.R. I04165, ¶ 37.
68
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. I-04165 at ¶ 37.
69
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. I-04165 at ¶ 37.
70
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. I-04165 at ¶ 37.
71
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
72
Id.
73
Gebhard, 1995 E.C.R. I-04165 at ¶ 37.
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the measure taken be rationally related to the interest pursued.74 Lackhoff75
concludes that only when the measure is discriminatory will the Supreme
Court ask if the measure is necessary to serve the public interest.76 In all
other cases, the Supreme Court would only question whether the burden
imposed on commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits.
However, it is dubious if this is a general rule. First, the Pike test only applies to statutes that regulate local public interests even-handedly and
thereby excludes direct discriminatory regulations.77 Furthermore, the division between factual discriminatory measures and purely hindering
measures is one of degree.78 Both the case law of the U.S. Supreme Court
and the ECJ demonstrate this. In opposition to the majority of the Supreme
Court in Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., Justice Brennan and
Justice Marshall treat the case as “protectionist in nature,”79 as it is designed to discourage interstate traffic. In European Law, Advocate General
Tizziano argues in SEVIC in favor of a mere restriction on the Freedom of
Establishment.80 The ECJ, however, qualifies the rules governing an intrastate merger by fusion as being “differen[t] in treatment ... which is likely
to deter the exercise of the freedom of establishment.”81
Nevertheless, the criterion as to whether a local public interest can be
promoted with a lesser impact on interstate commerce is less often deployed by the Supreme Court compared to the ECJ, as the U.S. judiciary
highly respects the legislative authority of the states.82
II. THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN COMPANIES
In both jurisdictions, states have tried to apply local rules to pseudoforeign companies, arguing that there is a closer connection of these companies to their jurisdiction.83 Pseudo-foreign companies are such companies
74

Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 323; S.C. State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc.,
303 U.S. 177, 191–92 (1937).
75
Lackhoff, supra note 2, at 323–24.
76
Id. at 324.
77
Id. at 323.
78
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
79
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 664 (1981).
80
Case C-411/03, Opinion of AG Tizziano in SEVIC Systems AG, 2005 E.C.R. I10805, ¶¶ 43–51.
81
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which are incorporated in one state, but do all of their business or most of
all of their business in another state.84 In the U.S., in principle, the internal
affairs doctrine is applicable, which corresponds to the incorporation doctrine in European terminology.85 This choice-of-law doctrine provides that
the law of the state in which the corporation is incorporated governs the
internal affairs of the company.86 However, laws in California and New
York provide for the application of their state law on selected internal affairs to companies incorporated in another state, as long as these companies mainly do business in their territory.87
In the EU, two choice-of-law doctrines coexist. The incorporation doctrine provides for the application of the law of the state of incorporation,
whereas the real seat doctrine provides for the application of the law of the
state in which the head office of the company is situated and the main
business decisions are put into practice.88 The main argument in favor of
the real seat doctrine is that the place in which the main business decisions
are made is the place in which the main contracting parties and the most
important creditors are situated and, therefore, these stakeholders are safeguarded.89 This, however, creates obstacles to the company’s mobility. If
the main place of business changes, a different law governs the internal
affairs of the company, which can lead to deprivation of legal personality.
The ECJ ruled on the treatment of foreign companies under the Freedom
of Establishment three times.90 First, Danish authorities refused to register
a branch of an English limited company trying to prevent the circumvention of minimum capital requirements.91 In the second case, the German
version of the real seat doctrine, which leads to denial of legal personality,
was held to be in violation of community law.92 Finally, taking a position
similar to that in Section 2115 of the California Corporations Code, the
84
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Netherlands applied a law imposing additional requirements on pseudoforeign companies to the English company Inspire Art Limited.93 The following section will assess the ability of states to legislate foreign companies
under both constitutional frameworks.
A. Foreign Companies Under the Interstate Commerce Clause
It is a commonplace that companies in the U.S. are governed by the internal affairs doctrine.94 This enables companies to choose their legal forum
and choose the most suitable state law to govern their company irrespective of their main place of business.95 But a closer look at company law in
the United States reveals a slightly different picture96 regarding the choiceof-law in the U.S. Inter alia, Section 2115 of the California Corporations
Code led to an ongoing discussion about the treatment of pseudo-foreign
companies under the Interstate Commerce Clause.97 Section 2115 of the
California Corporations Code provides that corporations incorporated in another member state are subject to certain internal governance rules if they
operate substantially in California.98 A company operates substantially in
California if more than 50% of the average of a corporation’s property, payroll, and sales factors are allocated to California and more than one-half of
its voting securities are held by persons having addresses in California pursuant to the books of the corporation.99 Foreign companies with outstanding securities listed on a national securities exchange are excluded.100
The objective of the law is to “prevent foreign corporations from circumventing Californian law while” their ties to California are stronger
than to any other state.101 Therefore, the provision is applicable even if it is
clear from the circumstances of the case that the company does not want to
apply the California Corporations Code to its internal affairs.102 California
is not the only state that enacted provisions of special treatment of foreign
93
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companies and thereby derogated the internal affairs doctrine. Sections
1319 and 1320 of the New York Business Corporation Law (NY BCL) provide that domestic rules, inter alia, on shareholder rights and mergers are
applicable to foreign unlisted companies that conduct more than one-half of
their business income activities in the State of New York.103 There has not
been a U.S. Supreme Court decision on these statutes, even though the constitutionality under the Interstate Commerce Clause is largely contested.104
While Californian courts argued that Section 2115 of the California Corporations Code was constitutional under the Interstate Commerce Clause,105
Delaware’s courts refused to apply the Californian law and deemed it in
violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause.106
In Ross A. Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific,107 the Court of Appeal of California addressed the issue of the constitutionality of Section 2115 of the
California Corporations Code.108 Ross Wilson sought a declaratory judgment that Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc., a company incorporated in
Utah, fulfilled the qualification of a pseudo-foreign company under the
California Corporations Code and therefore cumulative voting was mandatory.109 Except for being incorporated in Utah, the corporation had no business connection with Utah.110 The principle place of business has been in
California since 1971, the meetings of shareholders and directors took
place in California, and all employees and all bank accounts have been in
California.111 After declaring that the Californian law was constitutional
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the Court turned to the Interstate
Commerce Clause.112 The balancing test, as established in Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., is stated as the relevant standard under the Commerce
Clause.113 The Court found that the Californian statute regulates evenhandedly as it applies the same rules, which apply to corporations domiciled in California, to pseudo-foreign corporations.114 The Court denied
103
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that the law placed undue burdens on interstate commerce.115 It would deter
corporations from reincorporating elsewhere “for the purpose of avoiding
California’s protective corporate legislation, and thus to diminish the practice of ‘charter-mongering’ among states.”116 This would not contradict
the Commerce Clause.117 Furthermore, there was no direct evidence that
Section 2115 of California Corporation Code caused foreign companies to
reduce property, payroll, and sales in California.118 Thus, the law would not
have the purpose of deterring foreign corporations from doing business in
California. Addressing the question of whether the law places undue burdens on interstate commerce by creating legal uncertainty, the Court held
that the Californian law would minimize uncertainty, since “[a] corporation can do a majority of its business in only one state at a time.”119 The
potential for conflicting regulations applying to the same company would
be “speculative and without substance.”120 The Court did not consider the
public interest requirements and their proportionality but concluded that
the effects on interstate commerce were “incidental, and minimal in relation to the purpose which that requirement is designed to achieve.”121
In contrast to the Californian courts, Delawarean courts repeatedly
held that the internal affairs doctrine would be mandated by the Interstate
Commerce Clause.122 Consequently, in McDermott Inc. v. Harry Lewis
and Nina Altmann,123 the Supreme Court of Delaware held the Panamanian
law to be applicable to a company incorporated in Panama.124 The issue in
the case was that Panamanian law allowed cross voting of shares between
parent companies and their subsidiaries.125 However, this did not cause the
Delaware Supreme Court to derogate from the internal affairs doctrine,
since its application would be not only a question of conflict of laws, but
also one of “serious constitutional proportions.”126 The Court relied heavily
on the U.S. Supreme Court case CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,127
which did not, however, involve the treatment of foreign companies by the
115
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internal affairs doctrine, but the discretion of states to govern domestic
corporations.128 Nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme Court derived from
this case that “the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by constitutional
principles except in ‘the rarest situations.’”129
In the case VantagePoint Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc.,130 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that the internal affairs doctrine is comprehensively safeguarded as a constitutional principle.131 VantagePoint, a venture capital firm, was a majority shareholder of a preferred class of shares
of Examen, Inc., a company incorporated in Delaware.132 Examen, Inc.
planned to merge with Reed Elsevier.133 If there had been a class vote, as
mandated by Californian law, VantagePoint would have been able to block
the merger.134 Therefore, VantagePoint argued that pursuant to Section 2115
of the California Corporation Code, Californian law would apply.135 Both the
Delaware Chancery Court and the Supreme Court of Delaware, however,
applied the internal affairs doctrine with the result that Delawarean law
was applicable.136 In its decision, the Supreme Court of Delaware argued
that the internal affairs doctrine is mandated by constitutional principles
such as the Due Process Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause.137
Under the Commerce Clause, the court held, a state had no interest in regulating the internal affairs of foreign corporations.138
The issue of whether the laws on pseudo-foreign companies are constitutional under the Commerce Clause is just as unresolved in legal debate.
Stevens139 has criticized VantagePoint, arguing that the Delaware Supreme
Court misinterpreted the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law.140 Kruse141 and
DeMott142 have argued that Section 2115 of the California Corporate Code
violates the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause. They argue that the rule
would place undue burdens on the free flow of interstate commerce, as
128
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uniformity of corporate internal affairs would be necessary to ensure certainty in the companies’ dealings.143 The Californian law would leave a company in an unstable situation since its applicability would depend on the
annual statements.144 Furthermore, Section 2115 of California Corporate
Code would not regulate companies even-handedly since it excluded listed
corporations.145 DeMott points out that the application of Californian law in
itself does not constitute a public interest, at least in those cases, as significant business by the company is allocated outside the state of California.146
Kruse147 acknowledges that the Californian law safeguards public welfare interests, but argues that no special creditor protection is needed as creditors
usually can protect themselves in arm’s-length transactions.148 Regarding
the protection of minority shareholders, such as in mandatory cumulative
voting, the law would be excessive, as other states would view one shareone vote rules as sufficient in order to protect minorities.149
Oldham150 argued, on the contrary, that laws on pseudo-foreign companies were constitutional under the Interstate Commerce Clause, as long
as legal certainty was safeguarded in the long run.151 Even though these laws
would create a burden on interstate commerce, they would be justified under
the balancing test. The states would have a public policy interest in protecting creditors and resident shareholders from fraudulent or unfair practices. The laws on foreign companies would promote these interests.152
Furthermore, there would be no less burdensome alternative to pseudoforeign corporation laws.153
In sum, the question of whether the internal affairs doctrine is a constitutional principle mandated, inter alia, by the dormant Interstate Commerce
Clause remains unresolved in the U.S. While the Delaware Supreme Court
does not apply the Californian rule on foreign companies, arguing it is unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, the Californian courts apply
Californian law to Delawarean companies.154 The fear that this will lead to a
143
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“race[] to the courthouse[s]” in crucial cases seems to be well founded.155
However, it must be remembered that both laws have existed in New York
and California for several decades and, so far, no profound signs can be
found that they are impeding interstate commerce.156 Moreover, the mere
fact that the constitutional question remained unresolved for so long even
though the legal arguments are obvious shows that the rules in question
play a minor role in practice. The reason is that small companies have little
incentive to incorporate in a state in which they do no business.157 The
mandatory internal governance rules do not seem to offer incentives for
incorporation in another state.
B. Foreign Companies and the Freedom of Establishment
The American debate about the constitutionality of rules on foreign
companies finds its European counterpart in the discussion around the
ECJ’s decisions in Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art. Here, the ECJ
held that restrictions on foreign companies were inapplicable under the
Freedom of Establishment. In Centros,158 the ECJ held that a Member
State cannot refuse to register a branch of a company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State, even if it was obvious from
the facts of the case that the company was formed in order to circumvent
minimum capital requirements.159 Centros Limited, a private limited company registered in England and Wales, wanted to register a branch in
Denmark.160 The Danish authorities refused to register the branch, arguing
that Centros was in fact seeking to establish a principal establishment in
Denmark, since it does not trade in the UK.161 In the proceedings, the
founders and shareholders of the company did not deny that the purpose
of the formation of the company under English law was to avoid Danish
legislation requiring that a minimum capital be paid up.162 The ECJ decided
155
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that it violated the Freedom of Establishment to refuse to register a branch
of a company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State
in which it was registered, even if it conducted no business in the state of
registration.163 The refusal of registration constituted an obstacle to the exercise of the Freedom of Establishment.164 Most importantly, according to
the court, the circumvention of the minimum capital requirements did not
constitute an abuse of European law.165 Instead, the Court stated, “the fact
that a national of a Member State who wishes to set up a company chooses to
form it in the Member State whose rules of company law seem to him the
least restrictive ... cannot, in itself, constitute an abuse of the right of establishment.”166 This statement is seen as the signal for regulatory competition
in European company law, which would lead to a “Delaware Effect.”167
Unlike in the EU, in the U.S. a right to choose the most suitable regulatory framework is not seen as a right granted by the Interstate Commerce
Clause.168 In contrast to Centros, the Court of Appeal of California states
in Ross Wilson v. Louisiana-Pacific Resources, Inc.169 that reducing the
“practice of ‘charter-mongering’” among states is not offending the policies of the Commerce Clause.170
Furthermore, in Centros the refusal to register the branch because it
did not pursue any business in England was held to be disproportional and
could therefore not be justified by mandatory requirements of public interest, such as to safeguard the interests of creditors.171 The measure was held
to be unsuitable for protecting creditors, because creditors would not be
more protected if the company pursued business in England.172 Secondly,
creditors would be on notice that Centros Limited was a company governed by English law.173 According to the ECJ, there are less restrictive
measures to protect creditors than refusing the registration of the branch;
for example, it could be made “possible in law for public creditors to obtain the necessary guarantees.”174 These last arguments are in line with the
163
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argument put forward by Kruse, in relation to the Californian Corporate
Code, that creditors can protect themselves in arm’s-length transactions.175
Finally, according to the ECJ, the refusal to register a branch is held to
be an excessive measure in order to combat fraud. A member state could
adopt appropriate measures where the attempt of fraudulent behavior has
been established in fact.176 In Überseering, the ECJ applied the reasoning
of Centros to the primary Freedom of Establishment.177 Here, the real seat
doctrine was contested.178 The proceedings involved a company registered in
the Netherlands, Überseering BV, which pursued business in Germany.179
According to the real seat doctrine, which is applicable in Germany, the
law of the state in which the economic decisions are put into practice and
the company’s actual center of administration is located determines the
legal capacity of a company.180 The German courts found that the company’s
center of administration was in Germany and that the company lacked legal
capacity since it was not registered in Germany and did not fulfill the conditions of German company law.181 The ECJ distinguishes between inbound situations, in which a company formed and registered under the law
of one Member State sees its right of establishment infringed by the law of
the host Member State, and outbound situations, in which a company
formed and registered under the law of one Member State sees its rights of
establishment infringed by the law of the state in which it was founded.182
Accordingly, the ECJ held that the
refusal by a host Member State (“B”) to recognise the legal capacity of
a company formed in accordance with the law of another Member State
(“A”) in which it has its registered office on the ground ... that the company moved its actual centre of administration to Member State B ...
constitutes a restriction on freedom of establishment ....183

This statement rendered the real seat doctrine inapplicable to European
companies in inbound situations.
The ECJ is tight-lipped when it comes to the question of whether the
real seat doctrine could be justified by mandatory requirements. “[T]he
175
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protection of the interests of creditors, minority shareholders, employees
and even the taxation authorities, may, in certain circumstances and subject
to certain conditions, justify restrictions on freedom of establishment.”184
However, none of these objectives could justify the denial of legal capacity
in a host Member State.185 “Such a measure is tantamount to an outright
negation of the freedom of establishment.”186 On a national level, the
courts of jurisdictions that apply the real seat doctrine have reacted by applying the incorporation doctrine in relation to foreign companies from
other EU Member States.187
The situation in Centros and Überseering is significantly different
from the situation concerning the laws on pseudo-foreign companies in the
U.S. In Centros and Überseering, the states barred foreign companies completely from their territory so long as they would not incorporate according to local law.188 A situation more comparable with the laws on foreign
companies is the situation the ECJ had to deal with in Inspire Art.
Inspire Art, a private limited company by shares, was formed under
English law and registered in the United Kingdom.189 The Dutch authorities
applied a law on formally foreign companies (wet op de formeel buitenlandse
venootschappen—WFBV) and required registration as a formally foreign
company and compliance with minimum share capital requirements.190
Article 1 of the WFBV defines a “formally foreign company” as “a
capital company formed under laws other than those of the Netherlands
and having legal personality, which carries on its activities entirely or
almost entirely in the Netherlands and also does not have any real
connection with the State within which the law under which the
company was formed applies.”191

Netherland had argued that these companies “are fully recognised ... and
are not refused registration,” but have to comply solely with a number of
additional obligations.192
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The ECJ had to decide if this law violated the Freedom of Establishment.
The ECJ held that the Dutch law on formally foreign companies “has the
effect of impeding the exercise ... of the freedom of establishment.”193 As
far as the mandatory public interest of creditor protection being a possible
justification, the ECJ repeated that “potential creditors are put on sufficient
notice” that the company is not governed by Dutch law but by English
law.194 A Member State would be entitled to prevent improper or fraudulent exercise of the Freedom of Establishment.195 This, however, would
not be the case in the situations envisaged by the “WFBV.”196
C. Comparative Conclusions
Even though there are strong similarities between the cases decided by
the ECJ and those by the U.S. Supreme Court, the issues differ. The cases
decided by the ECJ involved either the total denial of legal personality as
in Überseering or the creditor protection by minimum capital requirements.197 The laws of California and New York in contrast are more concerned with the protection of minority shareholders rights by specific local
governance rules, which seem to have less disruptive effects on the common
market.198 Secondly, in Inspire Art, the Dutch authorities forced Inspire
Art to comply with the rules in order to keep on pursuing business in the
Netherlands and thereby created a market entry barrier.199 The laws on
foreign companies in the U.S. simply apply local law in disputes between
shareholders.200 On another level, the laws on foreign companies in the U.S.
states are broader in scope than the European laws under consideration by
the ECJ. The European case law involved companies that pursued no
business at all in the state of incorporation and almost all of their business
in the host Member State.201 The laws on foreign companies in California
and New York apply to situations in which the contact of the company
with the state of incorporation includes real economic existence.202 In sum,
the ECJ takes a stricter stand in comparison to the legal discussion in the
193
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U.S. The ECJ upholds high standards when it comes to proportionality but
leaves some scope for rules preventing fraud and protecting creditors and
shareholders, as the protection of their interests are recognized as mandatory requirements of public interests.203 However, this scope has so far
played no role in legal discussions, as the European case law led to the
unlimited application of the incorporation doctrine in inbound cases at
Member State level.204 Whereas the ECJ focuses on the question of proportionality, the discussion in the U.S. is focused on the deterring effects
of legal uncertainty arising from the application of the rules on foreign
companies by the host state.205 Thus, the discussion in the U.S. is concerned with the scope and limits of intervention by the host state when it
comes to foreign companies, while the European discussion seems decided
in favor of the unlimited application of the incorporation doctrine.
III. LIMITS ON STATE POWER TO REGULATE
DOMESTIC COMPANIES
While the last section dealt with the treatment of foreign companies in
states different from their state of incorporation, the following section will
focus on the constitutional limits on the states’ ability to regulate companies incorporated under domestic law.
In this regard, both the ECJ and the U.S. Supreme Court emphasize
that companies are creatures of the law and that they only exist by virtue
of the sovereignty by which they are created and that thereby determine
their functioning.206 This argument is used in both jurisdictions to broaden
significantly the states’ discretion in regulating companies. The U.S. Supreme
Court thereby gave the states significant scope to enact laws that have prohibiting effects on take-overs.207 The ECJ on the other hand gave Member
States the right to require from companies that they keep their head office and
the place of registration in the same place.208 Two lines of comparison can be
drawn. Firstly, the use of the creature argument under the outbound Freedom of
Establishment is compared to the U.S. case law. Secondly, it can be questioned
203
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if the ECJ would come to the same conclusions as the Supreme Court in respect to the Freedom of Capital and Establishment, when it comes to possible
restrictions of foreign investors’ access to capital markets.209
A. Domestic Companies and the Interstate Commerce Clause
Two cases of the U.S. Supreme Court are central when it comes to states’
discretion to regulate domestic companies under the Commerce Clause. Firstly,
in Edgar v. MITE Corp., the Illinois Business Take-Over Act was declared invalid under the Commerce Clause.210 Second, in CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, significant discretion was given to the states.211 Both state laws in
question included provisions, which had deterring effects on take-overs and
share acquisitions.212 In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,213 the Illinois Business TakeOver Act required the tender offeror to notify the Secretary of State and the
target company, but not the shareholders of the target company of its intended
offer, twenty days before the offer became effective. In that way the management of the target company could inform its shareholders about the offer, without the interference of the offeror.214
The rule should apply not only to target companies incorporated in Illinois,
but also to companies of which shareholders from Illinois own 10% of the
class of securities subject to the take-over offer, have their principal office in
Illinois, or have at least 10% of their state’s capital represented in the state.215
The law therefore regulated foreign companies as well. However, the regulation on foreign companies was not the decisive reason for the U.S. Supreme
Court declaring the rule invalid under the Commerce Clause.
Instead, the Court held the Illinois Act was already invalid, since it directly regulated interstate commerce.216 Since the transactions of shares in a
take-over normally take place across state lines or even wholly outside the
State of Illinois, and the Act would apply even if not a single shareholder
were a resident of Illinois, the Act constituted a direct restraint on interstate
commerce.217 Additionally, the invalidation under the Pike test did not rely
heavily on the reasoning that the Act regulated foreign companies.218 Rather,
209
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the Supreme Court used this as a counter-argument to the alleged interest in
regulating companies incorporated in Illinois.219 The Court rejected the
argument that Illinois has an interest in regulating the internal affairs of a
corporation incorporated under its law by stating that this would be
“somewhat incredible, since the Illinois Act applies to tender offers for any
corporation for which 10% of the outstanding shares are held by Illinois
residents.”220 Illinois would not have an “interest in regulating the internal
affairs of foreign corporations.”221
The Court stressed the burdens on interstate commerce created by the
power of the Illinois Secretary of State to block a nationwide tender offer.222
“The reallocation of economic resources to their highest valued use, a process which can improve efficiency and competition, is hindered.”223 The
Court then goes on to reason that the rule was excessive in two aspects, of
which only one was the effect on foreign companies.224 The other was that
the Court was unconvinced that the Act enhanced the position of the
shareholders;225 the Court, therefore, did not accept there was a legitimate
interest of resident shareholder protection.
In CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a state has no interest in protecting non-resident shareholders of nonresident companies, but rejected that a state has no interest in providing
for shareholder rights in domestic corporations. 226 Thus, the U.S. Supreme
Court itself narrowed the interpretation of Edgar v. MITE Corp. to the decisive argument that the Illinois Act regulated foreign companies as well
as Illinois companies.227 CTS v. Dynamics Corp. of America228 dealt with
Chapter 42 of the Indiana Business Corporation Law (BCL), which applies to corporations that are incorporated in Indiana,229 and which have
specified levels of shareholders within Indiana,230 and have not opted out
of the chapter.231 This law provides that the acquisition of shares above a
specific threshold (control shares) does not confer voting rights unless a
219
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majority of all pre-existing disinterested shareholders so agree at the next
regularly scheduled meeting. The thresholds are 1/5, 1/3, and 1/2 of the
voting shares.232 Dynamics Corp. of America tried to increase their shareholding in CTS, which was subject to Chapter 42 of Indiana BCL, from
9.6% to 27.5%, by announcing a tender offer.233 Holding that Chapter 42
was not pre-empted by the Williams Act, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether the Chapter violates the Interstate Commerce Clause.234
Thereby, the Court first of all denied there were any discriminatory effects
of the Chapter.235 The Court rejected the position that the rule discriminates against interstate commerce, as “nothing in the Indiana Act imposes
a greater burden on out-of-state offerors than it does on similarly situated
Indiana offerors.”236 Furthermore, the law would not create undue burdens
on interstate commerce.237 Since “[a] corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in contemplation of law ... it possesses
only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it.”238
Therefore, Indiana would have the authority to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the voting rights of shareholders.239
The Court recognized the need for a liquid capital market and the ability of
companies to draw foreign companies to them.240 However, “[t]his beneficial free market system depends ... upon the fact that a corporation—except
in the rarest situations—is organized under, and governed by, the law of a
single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law of the State of its incorporation.”241 It is “an accepted part of the business landscape ... for States
to create corporations, to prescribe their powers, and to define the rights
that are acquired by purchasing their shares.”242 The Court’s reasoning
was based upon the tremendous trust reposed in the states as the creators
of companies.243 According to this reasoning, interstate commerce of
shares takes place within the framework established by state law to regulate companies.244 Therefore, the hampering effects the rule has on tender
offers and, thereby, on take-overs in general do not stand in contrast to the
232

IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-42-1 (West 1986).
CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 75.
234
Id. at 87.
235
Id.
236
Id. at 88.
237
Id.
238
Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 636.
239
CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 89.
240
Id. at 90.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 91.
243
Id.
244
Id.
233

94

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:067

Interstate Commerce Clause.245 “[T]he very commodity that is traded in
the ‘market for corporate control’—the corporation—is one that owes its
existence and attributes to state law.”246 The U.S. Supreme Court does not
see it as its task to liberalize the market in this respect. Instead, it is
stressed that “[t]he Constitution does not require the States to subscribe to
any particular economic theory”247 and that the Court is “not inclined ‘to
second-guess the empirical judgments of lawmakers.’”248 The Supreme
Court thereby gives states an almost unlimited discretion to regulate companies which are incorporated in their state.249
The decision correlates to the earlier decision to exclude companies
from the Privileges and Immunities Clause.250 In both situations, the Court relies heavily on the argument that corporations are creatures of local law and,
therefore, have only the rights given to them by the law as its creator.251
Accordingly, shareholders do not have a natural right of voting power in a
company, just as a company has only the rights which are given to it by the
state’s legislation.252 Even more remarkable is that the U.S. Supreme Court
did not address the fact that companies under Chapter 42-5 of the Indiana
BCL could opt out of the provisions.253 The Court could have reasoned
that the burdens on the foreign shareholder in the Indiana Corporation
could be regarded as having been imposed, not by the state, but by the
shareholders of the corporation. The application of the Commerce Clause
would then be limited to mandatory state law.
B. Domestic Companies and EU Freedoms
Constraints on the power of Member States to regulate domestic companies under the legal framework of the EU are a result of the outbound
Freedom of Establishment and the Freedom of Capital.254 Both freedoms
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give rise to comparison between the described case law of the U.S. Supreme
Court and the judgments of the ECJ. In Cartesio, the ECJ restated the argument already used in Daily Mail, that companies are “creatures of national
law,” in order to give Member States the discretion to require companies
formed under local law to keep their head office at the place of registration.255
It is questionable, however, whether the creature argument works in a similar manner in the constitutional framework of the United States and the
European Union. Further, it has to be questioned if the Freedom of Capital
and Establishment prevent states from creating barriers to the market for
corporate control, which are allowed under the CTS Corporation case law
in the U.S.256 The European framework would then be considerably more
market integrating than would the U.S. framework.
1. The Creature Doctrine in European Law
The argument that, unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of
the law can be found not only in the U.S. constitutional decisions on state
company law, but in the legal doctrine of the Freedom of Establishment in
one of the early cases of the ECJ on that matter.257 Neglected and disdained
in the decade after the Centros decision, the argument found a great renaissance in Cartesio.258 Both decisions touch on the issue of the relationship between Freedom of Establishment and choice-of-law doctrines in
outbound situations.259
In Daily Mail, a public limited company incorporated in England
transferred its head office to the Netherlands, which did not result in a loss
of legal personality.260 However, English law requires the application of
the tax regime of the place where the company’s central management is
located.261 Yet, the UK Treasury would not accept the movement of the
head office, proposing that Daily Mail should at least pay a part of the taxes
to the British authorities.262 The ECJ, while acknowledging an outbound
Freedom of Establishment for companies in principal, nevertheless concluded that the measures in question imposed no restriction on the outbound Freedom of Establishment of companies.263 The Court stressed that
255
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the consent of the Treasury is only needed when a company transfers its
central management out of the United Kingdom while maintaining its status as an English company.264 “In that regard it should be borne in mind
that, unlike natural persons, companies are creatures of the law and, in the
present state of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only
by virtue of the varying national legislation which determines their incorporation and functioning.”265 By referring to the different rules of the
Member States concerning the movement of the head office, the ECJ gave
Member States the right to restrict the movement of the head office in situations where companies are and want to remain governed by the law of
their home jurisdiction.266
It remained unclear, however, if the real seat doctrine had similarly been
excluded from the scope of the outbound Freedom of Establishment.267 In
its extreme manifestation, the real seat doctrine leads to the dissolution of
the company if the head office is moved to another real seat jurisdiction.268
Therefore, Advocate General Maduro, in his opinion in Cartesio, argued
that the real seat doctrine should be found inapplicable under the outbound
Freedom of Establishment.269 The ECJ, however, did not follow his opinion.270
Cartesio dealt with a company formed under Hungarian law, which transferred its head office to Gallarate, Italy.271 Following the real seat doctrine,
Hungarian law prohibited a company incorporated in Hungary from transferring its head office abroad while continuing to be subject to Hungarian
law as its personal law.272 The Court governing the commercial register
therefore rejected the motion to enter Gallarate as the new location of the
head office.273 “[S]uch a transfer of [the head office] would require first, that
the company cease to exist and, then, that the company re-incorporate itself
in compliance with the law of the country where it wishes to establish its
264
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new seat.”274 The ECJ addressed this issue, repeating its statement made in
Daily Mail: “[C]ompanies are creatures of national law and exist only by
virtue of the national legislation which determines their incorporation and
functioning.”275 In accordance, the Member States have the right to define
the connecting factors that make the legal entity a company under the law
of the Member State.276 The definition of the legal entities as companies,
which enjoy the Freedom of Establishment, is therefore a “preliminary
matter which ... can only be resolved by the applicable national law.”277 It
is thus national law, which defines under what conditions a company is
“formed in accordance with the law of a Member State” (Article 54 (1)
TFEU).278 This includes the power of a Member State to prohibit a company formed under local law from moving its head office abroad.279 The
ECJ recognizes in return the right of a company to convert itself, “without
prior winding-up or liquidation,” into a company governed by another
law.280 In this respect, European company law is approaching the situation
found in the U.S. The states have large defining powers; however, companies enjoy the possibility of reincorporating in another state.281
2. Comparative Conclusions
Firstly, one has to note a paradox: the reasoning used in the American
legal discussion to explain the internal affairs doctrine is used by the ECJ to
justify the existence of the real seat doctrine under the Freedom of Establishment.282 Secondly, as pointed out earlier, in the American context the
creature argument can rely on a consistent distinction between natural persons and companies.283 Companies under the constitutional framework of
the U.S. are treated unlike natural persons, as they cannot rely on the
274
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Privileges and Immunities Clause, nor are similar rights granted by the
Interstate Commerce Clause.284 In contrast, the EU Treaties and the ECJ
emphasize the correlation of natural persons and companies.285 The EU
Treaties treat companies, as defined in Article 48, “in the same way as
natural persons who are nationals of Member States.”286 Therefore, an argument beginning with the words “unlike natural persons” must force contestation in the European Law context.287
C. The Indiana Corporation from a European Law Perspective
From a comparative point of view, it is interesting to assess if the rule
upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court as constitutional in CTS would comply
with the EC Freedom of Capital and Establishment, if a European member
state were to enact such a rule. To reiterate, Chapter 42 of the Indiana Business
Corporation Law provides that the acquisition of shares above a specific
threshold does not include voting rights unless a majority of all preexisting
disinterested shareholders so agree at their next regularly scheduled meeting.288
This rule applies to companies incorporated in Indiana that have not opted
out of the provision.289
1. Freedom of Capital
The ECJ decided on similar laws in its so-called golden share judgments.290
These judgments involved special rights granted mostly to state authorities in
former state-owned enterprises. In Commission/France,291 a rule applicable
to the Société National Elf-Aquitaine provided that any shareholding exceeding the ceiling of 1/10, 1/5 or 1/3 of a company’s capital or of its voting rights must first be approved by the Minister of Economic Affairs.292
The ECJ states that direct investment in the form of participation in an
undertaking by means of shareholding or securities acquisition constitutes
284
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capital movement.293 Further, the rule constitutes a restriction on the free
movement of capital.294
Even though the rules in issue may not give rise to unequal treatment,
they are liable to impede the acquisition of shares in the undertakings
concerned and to dissuade investors in other Member States from
investing in the capital of those undertakings. They are therefore liable,
as a result, to render the free movement of capital illusory.295

Concerning justification for the restriction of the freedom of capital,
the ECJ recognized the public interest of maintaining a consistent supply of
petroleum in the event of a crisis.296 However, the requirement for general
approval of the Minister was held to be disproportionate, as there was no
indication under what circumstances the authorization could be refused.297
The facts in Commission/Portugal298 were similar. Here, the relevant
law provided that the shareholding of all non-Portuguese investors should
be limited to 25% of the capital.299 Furthermore, the prior authorization of the
Minister of Financial Affairs was required for every acquisition of shares
representing more than 10% of the voting capital.300 The ECJ decided that
the limitation of 25% of capital for foreign investors was discriminatory
and, therefore, violated the free movement of capital.301 Regarding the requirement for authorization by the Minister of Financial Affairs, the ECJ
repeated the same ruling as in Commission v. France.302
In Commission/UK,303 the Articles of Association of the privatized
British Airport Authority provided for a general voting cap of 15%.304
Secondly, a special share was created which could only be held by the
Secretaries of State.305 This special share involved special decision rights on
important transactions.306 The ECJ came to the conclusion that the measures restricted the free movement of capital, as it limited the acquisition
293
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of shareholdings and restricted “the scope for participating effectively in
the management of a company or in its control.”307 Even though the restrictions would be non-discriminatory in nature, “they affect the position
of a person acquiring a shareholding as such and are thus liable to deter
investors from other Member States from making such investments and,
consequently, affect access to the market.”308
In Volkswagen,309 the Volkswagen Law provided for a 20% voting
cap, a qualified majority of 80% instead of 75%, and special board nomination powers for the Federal Republic of Germany and the state of Lower
Saxony.310 The ECJ qualified these measures as a state measure, even
though Germany argued that the law should historically be viewed as a
private law contract.311 The exercise of legislative powers is a manifestation of state power par excellence.312 The Court held that the qualified majority together with the voting cap would limit the possibility of other
shareholders participating effectively in the company and, therefore, “deter
direct investors from other Member States.”313 The same was held with
regard to the special board nomination powers.314
In the European case law, unlike Chapter 42 of the Indiana BCL, a state
entity was directly involved.315 The companies in question were partly stateheld and there was either a general voting cap or the requirement that a special state authority be granted in the case of a share acquisition.316 In contrast,
the decision to attach voting rights to the acquired shares is left to the remaining shareholders in the Indiana Corporation.317 However, this Article
ventures to argue that a rule like Chapter 42 of the Indiana BCL would violate the Freedom of Capital and Establishment, considering that the case
law describes it as constituting a state measure that deters direct investors.
It has to be pointed out that the judgments were not in any way swayed by
the fact that a state was directly involved as a shareholder of the companies
in the cases discussed.318 In contrast, in Commission/France, the potential
307
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exercise of public security policy serves as a possible justification.319 The
issue is further considered in Commission/UK, as the UK Government argued that the restrictions arose as a result of the normal operation of company
law.320 The ECJ rejected this argument by treating the articles of association as a state act instead of a private party agreement.321 In this respect, the
Court relied on the fact that the articles of association had to be approved
by the Secretary of State pursuant to the Airports Act 1986.322 Similarly,
in the case of the Indiana Corporation, the restriction derives from a state
law, and not from a private party agreement.323 Less clear in this respect is
the Volkswagen decision, as the Court only held the 20% voting cap in combination with the 80% supermajority liable to hinder the free movement of
capital.324 However, the Court qualified the Volkswagen law clearly as a state
measure, as “the exercise of legislative power by the national authorities duly
authorised to that end is a manifestation par excellence of State power.”325
A more controversial question is whether a default rule, like Chapter 42
of the Indiana BCL, can escape control under the Freedom of Capital principle. It has been argued that default rules in private law are not subject to
control under the EU Freedoms in general, since private parties can escape
them.326 However, excluding default rules from control under the EU Freedoms would dilute the effectiveness of EU law. Therefore, excluding default rules from the scope of the EU Freedoms is not demonstrative, as the
effet utile is a general principle of community law.327 EU law even requires
Member States to abstain from any measure, which could hinder the exercise of the four market freedoms.328 In fact, default rules do not give complete freedom of choice to the contracting parties, but are biased towards a
319
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certain solution.329 The contracting partner that wants to derogate from the
default rule has to incur the burdens of alteration. This is even more so in
company law, as a shareholder who wants to opt out of the regime would
have to incur additional costs to initiate a coalition among other shareholders and overcome the problems of rational apathy and collective action.
This controversial issue in European law was not even considered by the
U.S. Supreme Court in regard to Chapter 42 of the Indiana BCL.330 Finally,
it is open to question if a European version of Chapter 42 of the Indiana
BCL would be treated differently from the rules in the golden share cases,
since it is for the remaining shareholders to decide whether voting rights
are attached to the acquired shares.
Firstly, the factual uncertainty this rule creates, which deters investors
from acquiring shares, suggests this rule’s nonconformity with the freedom of capital. For the ECJ, the de facto resulting impediments on the
single market are what matter the most. Secondly, in the light of the reasoning of the ECJ in Commission/France, it is even more unlikely that
such a rule could be tolerated under the free movement of capital. The ECJ
stresses the factual and legal uncertainty the investor faces, if a share acquisition is subject to the authority of a state authority.331 This factual uncertainty is aggravated if it is for the shareholders to decide, since unlike
state entities, their discretion is not even restricted by general constitutional
principles such as, for instance, equal treatment.
2. Freedom of Establishment
Even though the parallel application of the Freedom of Establishment
and the Freedom of Capital is still contentious, the majority of legal scholarship and the ECJ favor a parallel application of both freedoms.332 In
such a case, the above reasoning applies in the same way for the Freedom
of Establishment,333 with the result that a rule like Chapter 42 of Indiana
BCL would violate the Freedom of Establishment if it were enacted by an
EU Member State. A direct investment, such as an investment targeted at
entrepreneurial activity in the company, constitutes an establishment under
Article 49 TFEU.334 Direct investments are concerned with the question at
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hand, since those are the investments in which voting rights matter.335
Doubts remain whether, here as well, the ECJ could use the argument that
companies are creatures of the law. However, the application of this reasoning by the ECJ so far is limited to the choice-of-law doctrines.336
3. Comparative Conclusion
In sum, the European framework seems to be significantly more restrictive and leaves the Member States with less power to regulate their
companies. This is mainly because the American system lacks the right of
free movement of capital when it comes to investments in companies.337
Whereas, the TFEU grants this right explicitly in the freedom of capital
and implicitly in the Freedom of Establishment, the Interstate Commerce
Clause does not grant a right to freedom of investments.338 According to
CTS, investors therefore only have the right to invest in U.S. companies as
state law grants it.339
Further, unlike the U.S. system, the division between natural persons
and companies as creatures of the law is not implemented in a consistent
manner.340 This is due to the equation of companies and natural persons in
Article 54 TFEU.341 Even though it is obvious that natural persons and
companies differ in many respects, neither the ECJ nor the legislator, nor
legal doctrine, has addressed the matter in broader scope.
IV. REASONS AND LESSONS
On the basis of the observations made beforehand, it has to be concluded that the ECJ’s interpretation of the Freedoms of Establishment and
Capital limits the powers to regulate company law at the state level more
severely than does the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the dormant Interstate Commerce Clause.342 This can be seen in the three areas assessed.
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Firstly, constitutional legal doctrine in the U.S. seems to tolerate the
special treatment of pseudo-foreign companies by host states, as this treatment is seen as imposing little hindrance on interstate commerce and the common market.343 Secondly, U.S. constitutional law consistently rejects every
notion of corporate citizenship.344 In accordance, in creating companies the
states have broad discretion to restrict the abilities of the companies.345
Finally, the Interstate Commerce Clause does not entail the right to free
movement of investment.346 What are the reasons for these differences?
What lessons can the EU learn from the legal debate in the U.S.?
A. Foreign Companies
When it comes to the question of why the U.S. legal system can be
more lenient as far as the special treatment of pseudo-foreign companies
by New York and California statutes is concerned, two differences matter
the most. First of all, the incentives for small companies to incorporate in
another Member State rather than in the home state seem to be minimal in
the U.S. compared to the EU.347 In the EU, high minimum capital requirements in some Member States are a major incentive for small companies
to incorporate in another Member State.348 The U.S. has a more uniform
company law in this respect. Interestingly, as regards larger companies,
European law has harmonized minimum capital requirements in Article 6
of the 2nd Company Law Directive.349 Larger firms, however, are unlikely
to do business in only one state and therefore seldom conflict with the
rules on pseudo-foreign companies.350
Hence, regulatory competition is turned upside down in the EU when
compared to the U.S. Large disparities remain with regard to small companies, where the development of pseudo-foreign companies is likely,
whereas the rules for larger companies are harmonized.351 The comparison
shows further that in certain areas of company law, such as the question of
343
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minimum capital requirements, convergence is needed; in other areas such
as internal corporate governance, however, diverse solutions will have
fewer negative effects on the functioning of a common market.352
Whereas the U.S. courts leave the issue of the special treatment of foreign companies by California and New York unresolved, the ECJ has taken
a strict stand. The reasons for the different approaches to the treatment of
foreign companies by the host state could easily be found in historical and
cultural arguments. The Single European Market is still young compared
to the common market of the U.S. Moreover, the EU is culturally more
diverse than the U.S. Each Member State brings with it a different legal
tradition deeply rooted in cultural beliefs.353 Accordingly, the company
laws in the U.S. could evolve in an existing common market, whereas the
company laws in Europe first have to be accommodated.
Buxbaum354 argues in this context that unlike the U.S., the EU institutions need a more activist approach, as the Single European Market is still
undergoing development.355 He argues that the ECJ will in the long run
take a more lenient view on the choice-of-law doctrine, resulting in a theory
of super-addition in which broad exceptions, such as the Californian rules
on foreign companies, are added to the incorporation doctrine.356 It remains
to be seen if the ECJ will be more lenient as integration advances. However,
it is unlikely that the ECJ would tolerate laws like those of California and
New York in the EU, considering the strict and clear stand it took on laws
governing pseudo-foreign companies in the Inspire Art decision. Even more
unlikely, at present, is that an EU member state would enact such laws,
since it would fear the strict actions of both the EU Commission and the
ECJ.357 The ECJ has set a standard with its decisions, from which it will
be hard to derogate.
The perspective this Article takes is, unlike Buxbaum’s, neither historical nor cultural, but relies on the functioning of a common market. This
Article argues that the legal differences matter. Certain areas of company
law need to converge, whereas other areas of company law can be more diverse without creating burdens on a single market structure. The question
352
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of minimum capital is especially crucial for the Single European Market in
two aspects. It creates not a factual but a legal entry requirement into the
markets.358 Secondly, it affects companies in terms of formation when they
are most flexible and least compliant to accepting charges and restrictions.359
The rules in California and New York in contrast are much softer in their
effect. They allow companies to enter the market and accept them as legal
entities, but require the application of certain internal governance rules.360
More importantly, there are few incentives to create a pseudo-foreign
company in the U.S. In the U.S., the problem of pseudo-foreign companies
was largely resolved by the factual convergence. U.S. law accidentally
avoided361 the problem of pseudo-foreign companies. Since low capitalization requirements prevail in the company laws of the U.S., the incentives to incorporate in a state different from the main place of business are
low.362 In contrast, different minimum capital requirements in the EU provide incentives to form pseudo-foreign companies with no economic connection to the country of incorporation.363
On the other hand, internal governance rules, like those in California
and New York, do not seem to create such incentives. Besides issues of
legal certainty, there are no visible disruptive effects on the functioning of
the common market.364 The reason the U.S. constitutional doctrine is more
lenient when it comes to the treatment of foreign companies by the host
state can be found, therefore, not in different approaches to the functioning
of the common market, but in the subject matter. This leads to the argument that convergence on the question of minimum capital requirements is
needed from a common market perspective, whereas divergence in respect
to governance rules can be tolerated.
What lessons can be learned from this insight? Firstly, one should be
cautious in transferring the same strictness with which the ECJ rejected
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the minimum capital requirements in other inbound cases. Secondly, convergence eventually has to be reached on minimum capital requirements
across Europe.365 Whether this is achieved by legislation via harmonization
or thorough regulatory competition is merely a question of policy. As long
as minimum requirements exist in some Member States, these Member
States create incentives for entrepreneurs to evade the regime by founding
a company in another jurisdiction.366 This fosters regulatory arbitrage and
exposes business partners and creditors to an unfamiliar legal regime.367
Pseudo-foreign companies are created, which have no real economic contact
with their state of incorporation. Convergence is therefore preferable. This
insight stands in stark contrast to harmonized law in the EU, which focuses
on large companies.368 Large companies, however, normally have business
contacts in many states and therefore are unlikely to be pseudo-foreign companies. Convergence has been created where it is less needed, whereas harmonization on smaller companies, which are more likely to be pseudo-foreign
companies, was neglected. Finally, internal corporate governance rules such
as cumulative voting rights and decision-making procedures do not have the
same hampering effects on the functioning of the internal market compared
to minimum capital requirements and can, therefore, be treated differently.369
B. Domestic Companies
The comparison shows that the states in the U.S. enjoy broad discretion when regulating companies formed and incorporated in accordance
with their law. Two major differences in law can be found. The U.S. constitutional law consistently rejects every notion of corporate citizenship.370
Further, the Interstate Commerce Clause does not entail a right to freedom
of investments as the EU freedom of capital does.371 This results in the
ECJ exercising stricter scrutiny and restricting Member States’ power to
regulate domestic companies more than the U.S. Supreme Court.372
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This Article argues that this, as well, is not because of the ECJ’s activist
approach, but is rooted in the very notion of the EU’s constitutional set-up.
Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the EU Treaty does accept the concept of a
company being a normal market participant.373 At the same time, the EU
Treaty acknowledges the capital market’s importance to the economic system
and, therefore, grants forceful rights to the free movement of capital.374
The reasons for these different approaches lie most obviously in the constitutional documents and the time in which they were created. Whereas
corporate personality had to be introduced as a new concept in the U.S.
constitutional framework, the legal capacity of companies was an established idea at the time the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957.375 The EU
could, therefore, set up a more modern framework, relying on their experiences with the functioning of a modern market economy.
These experiences are twofold. Firstly, companies are regarded not so
much as creatures of the law but as normal market participants, like natural
persons.376 Therefore, the Freedom of Establishment of companies does
not enjoy special treatment under the EU Treaty.377 Instead, it is simply
stated that companies are to be treated the same way as natural persons,
who are nationals of a Member State.378 Secondly, the importance of the
capital market to the economy was obvious to the founders of the European Community.379 This led to strong rights pertaining to freedom and direct investments under the EU Treaties.
Thus, when it comes to an efficient capital market, the EU Treaty has set
up a more modern constitutional framework than the U.S. does. Moreover, the
EU Treaty challenges legal doctrine by the simple equation of companies and
natural persons in Article 54 TFEU. In comparison to the U.S. constitutional
framework under which much broader rights of freedom have to be granted
to companies, the argument that companies are unlike natural persons as they
are only creatures of the law finds only limited textual basis in the Treaty.380
The ECJ could use this argument in Cartesio and Daily Mail only with
regard to the connecting factors a Member State uses to determine which
companies are domestic. Here, the Court could rely on the three connecting
373
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factors, which Article 54 TFEU explicitly treats equally: registered office,
central administration, and principal place of business.381 Taking the simple
equation of natural persons and companies into account, it is unlikely that
the creature argument could be used in order to broaden the discretion of
Member States in other fields of company law. On the other hand, a basic
truth lies in the argument that companies do not exist naturally, but are
created by rules. The pure existence of companies relies on the lawmaker.
Compared to the U.S. constitutional system, the TFEU creates a tension
between the equation of companies and natural persons in Article 54
TFEU and the fact that the existence of companies relies on laws.
CONCLUSION
The comparative analysis of the constitutional frameworks of the EU
and the U.S. in regard to state powers pertaining to company law has shown
that the U.S. constitutional framework is more lenient than the EU’s. Mandatory rules on pseudo-foreign companies are tolerated in the U.S. Concerning
the regulation of domestic companies, the U.S. gives broad discretion to
the states by consistently rejecting the concept of a corporate citizenship.
The more lenient approach is not due to an activist approach of the ECJ
or due to an activist phase of integration. Instead, these differences are
rooted in the specific legal set-up of the two common markets. In respect
to foreign companies, different minimum capital requirements in the EU
offer incentives for the creation of pseudo-foreign companies. In contrast,
the U.S. constitutional framework shows that different governance rules do
not seem to create large burdens on the functioning of the common market.
Concerning the discretion granted to states to regulate domestic companies,
the U.S. constitutional framework rejects any notion of corporate citizenship and therefore can deploy the argument that companies are creatures of
state law in order to grant states larger powers. The TFEU, in contrast, explicitly equates natural persons and companies, which has led to a stronger
scrutiny of Member State law in the long run. European legal doctrine is
faced with the paradox that the TFEU equates natural persons and companies,
whereas in reality companies differ from natural persons in many respects.
Finally, the broad discretion left to the states while regulating domestic
companies can have hampering effects on the common market, as can be
seen in the cases regarding the takeover market and the Indiana corporation. The EU constitutional framework is in better shape to address these
problems and can thereby create an increasingly efficient capital market.
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